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Abstract
I evaluate the impact of unilateral divorce laws (UDLs) on the risk of divorce via
two distinct channels: the effect on divorce of married couples (divorce effect), and the
effect on divorce through marital sorting (sorting effect). The divorce effect affects the
divorce probability of all married couples, while the sorting effect is only experienced
by couples that married after the implementation of UDLs. I use differences in the
timing of states’ enactment of UDLs as a source of exogenous treatment variation in a
difference-in-differences approach. Using the Divorce and Marriage file of Vital Statistics
from the NBER data collection, I find that UDLs have a profound impact on marital
sorting. The sorting effect significantly increases the cumulative risk of divorce within
any length of marriage, while the divorce effect is only significantly associated with
increasing the risk of divorce within the first 9 years and has no effect on subsequent
years. Moreover, unstable marriages dissolve faster due to changes in marital sorting.
The sorting effect increases the risk of divorce in each of the first 5 years of marriage
by 4.5%, while there is zero divorce effect for these same years. 31% of the initial in-
crease in the overall divorce rate identified in previous studies is due to the sorting effect.
Keywords: Marriage; Divorce; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Unilateral
Divorce Laws
JEL Classification: J12, K39
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1 Introduction
Unilateral divorce laws (UDLs) allow a divorce without requiring proof of fault or spousal
consent. In the late 1960s and early 1970s many states participated in a no-fault, unilateral
divorce revolution. During the same period, there was a marked rise in the crude divorce rate
– the number of divorces per thousand people – that peaked in 1981. The impact of loosening
divorce regulations has been the subject of heated debate in the economics literature. By
comparing the crude divorce rates pre- and post-implementation, Friedberg (1998) found
that UDLs increase crude divorce rates. On the contrary, Wolfers (2006), by examining the
dynamic effect of UDLs on divorce rates, found that this rise lasts less than 10 years, which
implies that couples married after the reform are not affected as much as those married
before the laws were enacted. Many people have interpreted Wolfers results as evidence that
unilateral divorce laws led to divorce in an existing stock of unstable marriages, but had a
positive, long-term effect on marriage stability.
This paper tests the hypothesis that marriages formed after UDLs are more stable than
those formed prior. Using a newly-constructed dataset, I measure the risk of divorce by
marriage cohort rather than by crude divorce rates. My results confirm that UDLs are
positively associated with divorce rates. However, UDLs decrease the marriage stability of
newly-formed marriages, which suggests that the law has a greater influence on the types
of marriages created rather than the types of previous marriages dissolved. Newly-formed
marriages are less stable than existing marriages regardless of the marriage length. Compared
to couples whose marriage and divorce decisions are unaffected by UDLs, the cumulative risk
of divorce for couples that married during the post-UDL era is about 7 percent higher for the
first 9 years of marriage. In contrast, the cumulative risk of divorce for couples that married
before the law and are affected by UDLs at the time of divorce is 2 percent higher than those
unaffected by UDLs within the first 9 years of marriage. Moreover, marriages formed in
the post-UDL era have persistently higher risks of divorce in each year of marriage, which
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indicates that newly-formed marriages dissolve faster than those married before the UDLs.
This is the first study to examine the effect of unilateral divorce laws on cohort-level
marriage stability. I evaluate the impact of UDLs on divorce through two distinct mechanisms.
The direct and immediate effect of UDLs on the likelihood of divorce of married couples
is the reduced cost of divorce, or the divorce effect. However, as divorce costs decrease,
single people’s expectations of marriage change accordingly. Some may regard UDLs as
insurance against unstable marriages and enter the marriage market; others may view the
law as a deterrent since it increases the likelihood of their spouse breaking the contract. As
a consequence, UDLs have a long-term effect on the risk of divorce by changing who gets
married and who they marry, which has been understudied in the literature. The effect of
UDLs on the risk of divorce through marital sorting is termed the sorting effect. Previous
studies examine the changes in crude divorce rate, neglecting the unique sorting effect of
UDLs on marriage stability, and treat marriages formed under different legal regimes as the
same if they dissolved in the same year. My results indicate that 31% of the initial increase in
the overall divorce rate these studies find is due to the sorting effect. On average, the sorting
effect increases the cumulative risk of divorce for couples married after the implementation of
UDLs by 5 percent for any marriage length, and the likelihood of divorce during each of the
first 5 years of marriage by 4.5 percent. The divorce effect, on the other hand, has a limited
impact on the cohort risk of divorce.
A number of studies have evaluated the effect of unilateral divorce laws on divorce. Most
previous studies focus on the impact on divorce per 1000 population. Becker (2009), Peters
(1986), Peters (1992), and Drewianka (2008) argued that unilateral divorce revolution did
not affect divorce rate, or at least was not a major cause of changing family structures. In
contrast, Friedberg (1998) argued that 17 percent of the increase in the crude divorce rate
between 1968 and 1988 could be explained by the move towards unilateral divorce. Allen
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(1992), Mammen (2008), and Gruber (2004) reached similar conclusions as Friedberg (1998):
UDLs significantly increased divorce rates.
Wolfers (2006) found UDLs cause a temporary increase in crude divorce rates for the first
decade, but a slightly negative long-term effect, which was later confirmed by Kim and Oka
(2014). This has been interpreted as evidence that the laws primarily affected those who
married before implementation, and that marriages formed after the revolution were more
stable than previously-formed marriages. Rasul (2006) suggested that marriages formed after
the implementation of UDLs were better matched. Similarly, Mechoulan (2006) argued that
women who married after the reform sorted themselves better upon marriage and thus faced
lower risks of divorce. However, his sample, which was from the Current Population Survey,
was limited in its marriage history and did not contain cohort-specific divorce information. In
addition, he assigned treatments based on the marriage year and interview year. Women who
married and divorced before the legal reform were treated the same as those who married
before the reform but divorced after the changes, if they were interviewed in the same year.1
To my knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effect of UDLs on divorce through
marital sorting. I employ a difference-in-differences approach with state and year fixed effects.
My empirical analysis uses the Marriage and Divorce Vital Statistics data. In order to
fully evaluate the sorting effect of UDLs on the risk of divorce, a dissolution of marriage is
1In addition to the analysis of the effect on divorce rates, there are many studies that evaluate the effect of
unilateral divorce laws on various subjects, which were mostly thought to be generated by changes in the cost
of divorce. Mammen (2008) and Olivetti and Rotz (2016) found positive associations between the enactment
of UDLs and female employment later in life. Genadek (2014) studied the relationship between unilateral
divorce laws and couple-level time allocation and found that married women from states with UDLs spent
less time doing housework than those in states without unilateral divorce laws. Stevenson (2007) argued
that the adoption of unilateral divorce laws reduced the investment in marriage-specific capital. Johnson
and Mazingo (2000), Gruber (2004), and Reinhold et al. (2013) all found negative influences of unilateral
divorce on people who were exposed to unilateral divorce in childhood. The investment and outcomes for
children were reduced after the legal transition (Ca´ceres-Delpiano and Giolito, 2008). Fertility also declined
due to unilateral divorce (Alesina and Giuliano 2006, 2007). Ca´ceres-Delpiano and Giolito (2012) and Dee
(2003) found that UDLs induced more crimes, while Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) argued that unilateral
divorce laws helped to address domestic violence and reduced female suicides as well as the number of women
murdered by their partners.
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characterized by two critical timing variables: the year of marriage and the year of divorce.
If a couple married after the UDLs, their risk of divorce is affected by both the sorting effect
and divorce effect; if a couple married before UDLs but divorced after the enactment of the
law, the risk of divorce is only affected by the divorce effect. For the non-affected cohorts,
neither marriage nor divorce decisions are affected by the unilateral divorce reform; Other
partially affected cohorts are influenced at the time of their divorce but not at time of their
marriage. The rest are the fully affected cohorts, couples for whom both marriage and divorce
decisions are made under the new legal regime. Under this framework, I propose two new
ways to measure cohort risks of divorce. The first is to measure the likelihood of divorce
within certain years of marriage, which is defined as the cumulative risk of divorce for each
marriage cohort. The second is to capture how fast each marriage cohort dissolves, which
is defined as the likelihood of divorce during each year of marriage. My findings for the
impact of the sorting effect of UDLs on the risk of divorce suggest that the unilateral divorce
revolution has profound, long-term influences on family structures.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes my data, while Section
3 describes methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and analysis. Section 5
concludes.
2 Data
Prior to modern divorce law reform, a divorce would be granted only if it was a mutual
and fault divorce. If either of these conditions failed to be met, couples were forced to stay
together, even if it was an unhealthy marriage. Consequently, getting a divorce was quite
costly and required considerable effort.
The unilateral no-fault revolution in the United States started in the late 1960s. By 1980,
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32 states had enacted unilateral divorce laws and 44 had adopted some form of no-fault
divorce laws. Both traditional liberal and conservative states allow for unilateral divorce
today. The most recent study that provides updated information on states with unilateral
divorce laws is Voena (2015).2 Most reform states adopted a unilateral divorce law between
1968 and 1975, and a few made the transition after 1975. Alaska was the first to adopt a
unilateral divorce law in 1935; Ohio was the most recent in 1992. The differences in the
timing of states’ enactment of UDLs provide sufficient variations for analysis. The years
during which unilateral divorce laws were enacted in different states can be found in Appendix
A.1 Table 8.
I use the Marriage and Divorce Data of the National Vital Statistics System from the
NBER collection of the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). The dataset includes
27 states’ reports for divorce and marriage happened from 1968-1995.3 Of these 27 states,
Voena (2015) divides them into 19 reform states and 8 non-reform states. Unfortunately,
there is no link between the Marriage and Divorce files at the individual level. Risk of divorce
is at the state-cohort-level. The number of new marriages formed in a year is calculated using
the NBER Marriage file, which is referred as the marriage cohort size. The NBER Divorce
file contains marriage information for each divorce. I look across all years of the divorce file
to calculate the quantity of divorces from each cohort. The risk of divorce for each cohort is
then calculated as the percentage of marriages dissolved by each marriage duration.4
2Most studies in the literature adopt legal reform information from Gruber (2004). Three states’ legal
reform years are coded differently in Voena (2015) from Gruber (2004). NM: 1973 in Voena (2015) vs. 1933
in Gruber (2004); OH: 1992 in Voena (2015) vs. No-change in Gruber (2004); WV: 1984 in Voena (2015)
vs. No-change in Gruber (2004). Years for OK and AK in Voena (2015) are updated with the information
provided in Gruber (2004) since Gruber coded for a specific year that falls within Voena’s range.
3There are non-digitized data for 1956-1967. The NCHS stopped producing Marriage and Divorce files
after 1995 due to a lack of funds. Eight states were not observed for the full time span: CA (1968-1977),
DE (1981-1995), DC (1986-1995), MA (1979-1995), NH (1979-1995), and SC (1971-1995). These states are
excluded in the empirical analysis.
Friedberg (1998) extended the variable - crude divorce rate - to every state from 1968-1995. Based on
Friedberg (1998), Wolfers (2006) extended the crude divorce rate to 1956-1998. I am not able to extend
data sample beyond 1968-1995 because the main outcome variable in this study requires detailed marriage
information (i.e. year married) for each divorce.
4Divorces are not restricted to the first marriages. Marriage duration is calculated based on the length of
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2.1 Cohort Risk of Divorce
In previous studies, divorce risk is defined as either the number of divorces per 1000 population,
or the number of divorces per 1000 marriages. However, the unilateral divorce revolution
alters not only the cost of divorce, but also who sorts into marriage. Couples that are married
and divorced under different divorce law regimes have distinct marriage incentives as well
as different divorce barriers. Given this definition, previous studies cannot disentangle the
effect of these two driving forces on the risk of divorce. In order to estimate the likelihood of
divorce across marriage cohorts, this paper measures the risk of divorce as follows:
(1) Cumulative risks of divorce of cohort c in state s within d years =
num. divorces of cohort c in state s within d years
num. marriages of cohort c in state s
(1)
(2) Hazard risks of divorce of cohort c in state s in the dth year =
num. divorces of cohort c in state s in the dth year
num. of surviving marriages in year d-1 of cohort c in state s
(2)
Where d represents the length of marriage and the risks of divorce are calculated by years
of marriage. The cumulative risk of divorce within d years measures the overall risks of
divorce for a marriage cohort within certain years of marriage. The hazard risk of divorce
measures the likelihood of divorce in a single year of marriage. The cohort risk of divorce can
be affected by the unilateral divorce laws in three ways. First, unilateral divorce laws increase
the likelihood of divorce of married couples by reducing divorce costs. Second, unilateral
divorce laws change the initial marriage composition of cohorts formed after the law by
changing the expectation of marriage stability. Third, though the laws do not affect the
initial composition of prior marriage cohorts, the subsequent marriage composition is changed
due to the unilateral divorce laws. The cumulative risk of divorce captures overall changes of
a marriage. For example, if a marriage lasts less than 12 months, its marriage duration is 0 (or divorced
within 1 year); if it lasts more than 12 months, but less than 24 months, the marriage length equals 1 year
(or divorced within 2 years).
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the cohort risk of divorce, while the hazard risk of divorce describes the likelihood of divorce
during the subsequent years of marriage.5
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Average risks of divorce
Cumulative Risks of Divorce Hazard Risks of Divorce
Divorce within Reform Non-reform Total Divorce at Reform Non-reform Total
1yrs 0.025 0.012 0.021 1st yr 0.025 0.012 0.021
2yrs 0.068 0.040 0.060 2nd yr 0.045 0.028 0.040
3yrs 0.110 0.074 0.104 3rd yr 0.050 0.036 0.046
4yrs 0.160 0.111 0.146 4th yr 0.050 0.039 0.047
5yrs 0.200 0.145 0.184 5th yr 0.047 0.038 0.045
6yrs 0.230 0.176 0.218 6th yr 0.044 0.036 0.042
7yrs 0.270 0.205 0.248 7th yr 0.040 0.033 0.038
8yrs 0.294 0.230 0.275 8th yr 0.037 0.031 0.035
9yrs 0.318 0.251 0.298 9th yr 0.034 0.028 0.032
10yrs 0.397 0.271 0.319 10th yr 0.031 0.026 0.029
11yrs 0.358 0.289 0.338 11th yr 0.029 0.024 0.027
Panel B: characteristics of marriage cohort
Reform Non-reform
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
White % 0.871 0.320 0.986 0.840 0.176 0.994
DW Score -0.039 -0.631 0.646 -0.073 -0.412 0.434
Age gap 2.601 1.954 3.375 2.654 2.040 3.149
Age gap (abs.) 4.072 2.838 5.034 4.255 3.218 4.936
Groom age 29.190 24.285 33.950 29.770 26.310 34.121
Bride age 26.590 21.950 31.290 27.116 23.779 31.863
Remarried groom 31.380% 0 45.786% 31.681% 0 50.722%
Remarried Bride 31.405% 0 47.946% 30.606% 0 52.977%
Note: Data source for marriage and divorce is Vital Statistics Divorce and Marriage file, and DW-
scores of senator can be found at https://legacy.voteview.com/dwnomin.htm.
Panel A reports the average risks of divorce, in terms of cumulative (left four columns) and hazard
(right four columns), in the first 11 years of marriage and by reform and non-reform states. Panel B
reports the characteristics of marriage cohorts in terms of (1) percentage of new marriages that both
spouses are whites, (2) average DW-scores, (3) average groom-bride age gap , (4) absolute value of
groom-bride age gap, (5) age at marriage of groom, (6) age at marriage of bride, (7) percentage of
grooms that are not at the first marriage, (8) percentage of brides that are not at the first marriage.
Table 1 describes the average risks of divorce across different marriage length as well as
the characteristics of marriage cohorts for the categories of reform states, non-reform states,
and all states. The cumulative risk of divorce and hazard risk of divorce in reform states are
higher than the non-reform states for all marriage length. In both reform and non-reform
states, the cumulative risk of divorce increases at longer length of marriage, while the hazard
risk of divorce increases in the first several years and declines in the later years of marriage.
5Due to the sample limitation, the data is not restricted to couples who were married and divorced in the
same state. States began to report marriage state of a divorce in 1972 and the empirical analysis suffers from
losing pre-periods of reform states by restricting to the post-1972 periods.
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Since cumulative risk of divorce includes all divorces of a marriage cohort within a given
marital length, the number of divorces in a cohort increases when more years of marriage
are observed. Hence, there are higher cumulative risks of divorce in later years of marriage
in both types of states. However, the cumulative risk of divorce in reform states increases
faster than in non-reform states. The hazard risk of divorce, in contrast, describes the risk
of divorce in a single year of marriage conditional on the number of surviving marriages.
Unstable marriages tend to dissolve faster than those that are better matched. The size
of surviving marriages shrinks over time as unstable marriages dissolve, which makes the
surviving marriages more stable than in the previous years. This explains why there are
higher hazard risks of divorce in early years than in later years of marriage. However, the
hazard risk of divorce in reform states increases faster than in non-reform states during the
first several years of marriage, meaning that there are more unstable marriages dissolving in
the early years of marriage in reform states than in non-reform; it declines faster in the later
years, indicating that surviving marriages in later years are more stable in reform states than
in non-reform states. The average percentage of white couples is about the same for both
reform and non-reform states. DW-score evaluates how liberal a state is, where 1 represents
extremely conservative and -1 represents extremely liberal. The average DW-score indicates
that the reform and non-reform states are about the same politically. All other marriage
characteristics of the reform and non-reform states show that they are no different in terms
of average groom-bride age gap, absolute groom-bride age gap, groom age, bride age, and
percentage of remarried grooms and brides.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative risk of divorce of cohort 1968-1989 within 6 years of mar-
riage6 by reform and non-reform states. Marriages from reform states face higher cumulative
risks of divorce than marriages from non-reform states. The crude divorce rate in Figure 2 is
from Wolfers (2006). There are higher divorce per 1000 population in reform states since the
6The last cohort that can be observed with a 6-year marriage history in my data sample is 1989.
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Figure 1: Cohort Risk of Divorce within 6 years
mid-1950s. The increasing divorce rate reached a peak after most reform states completed
the transition to unilateral divorce. Both cohort cumulative risk of divorce and crude divorce
rates exhibit an upward trending in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The gap between reform
and non-reform states for both cohort risks of divorce and crude divorce rates widened during
the periods where many states enacted the unilateral divorce laws and shrank thereafter.
To illustrate the changes in the cohort risk of divorce, Figure 3 describes the survival rate
of the 1970 marriage cohort within the first 10 years of marriage. Marriage survival rate
is measured as the number of surviving marriages in each subsequent marital year divided
by total number of marriages formed in the same year. The survival rate of reform states
that had enacted unilateral divorce laws by 1970 declines the fastest, whereas the survival
rates of reform states that had yet to pass the law by 1970 as well as non-reform states are
similar, and both are higher than the reform states. Figure 3 shows that marriages formed af-
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Figure 2: Crude Divorce Rate
Source: Wolfers [2006]
ter the unilateral divorce laws dissolve faster and face higher risks of divorce than those are not.
2.2 Replication of Wolfers (2006)
The Divorce file of the NBER Vital Statistics collection included 27 states from year 1968 to
1995 and 6 states with fewer sample years.7 Wolfers (2006)’s empirical analysis is based on
a larger panel of data with additional states and years. Since the risk of divorce is defined
differently in this study than Wolfers (2006), it is reasonable to investigate whether the
sample difference leads to different results.
7Crude divorce rate does not require a full marital history of each cohort. Thus, states with missing years
could still provide accurate crude divorce rates.
12
Table 2: Replicate Table 2 of Wolfers (2006)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First 2 yrs 0.302*** 0.401*** 0.428*** 0.201**
(0.0538) (0.0635) (0.0703) (0.0808)
Years 3-4 0.289*** 0.461*** 0.364*** 0.275**
(0.0648) (0.0891) (0.104) (0.119)
Years 5-6 0.291*** 0.529*** 0.364*** 0.403***
(0.0791) (0.117) (0.135) (0.155)
Years 7-8 0.351*** 0.650*** 0.433*** 0.506***
(0.0966) (0.145) (0.164) (0.188)
Years 9-10 0.161 0.509*** 0.361* 0.398*
(0.117) (0.174) (0.195) (0.225)
Years 11-12 0.0469 0.404** 0.283 0.353
(0.142) (0.203) (0.228) (0.262)
Years 13-14 0.0315 0.396* 0.255 0.288
(0.167) (0.231) (0.262) (0.301)
Year 15 0.251 0.601** 0.377 0.339
(0.205) (0.261) (0.306) (0.352)
Data Wolfers(2006) Wolfers(2006) Wolfers(2006) Shen(2017)
Year 56-88 68-88 68-88 68-88
State 51 51 33 33
Observations 1631 1043 624 624
Standard errors in parentheses. Weighted by state population
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: This is a replication of Table 2 in Wolfers (2006) based on the main
specification. Wolfers (2006) data is available on the author’s website and is
public accessible.
State- and year-fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends are controlled.
Results of column 1 to 3 are based on the data of Wolfers (2006) and results
of column (4) are are based on my data. Outcome variable of all columns is
the crude divorce rate defined as divorce per 1000 population. Results shown
in column 1 are identical to results of Table 2 in Wolfers (2006). Results in
Column (2) restrict Wolfers’s data to year 1968-1988, while results in column
(3) restrict to both 1968-1988 and my sample of states. Column (4) is based
on my data. My replication of Wolfers (2006) is consistent with his findings.
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Figure 3: Cohort 1970 Marriage Survival Rate
I replicate the main results of Wolfers (2006) in Table 2. The results in the first three
columns are based on sample in Wolfers (2006).8 Results in Column 1 are identical to Column
3 of Table 2 in Wolfers (2006), which is based on 50 states and D.C. from 1956 to 1988.
Results in Column 2 are based on the sample period from 1968 to 1988. Cutting the sample
period decreases the magnitude of coefficient estimations, but maintains the direction of the
impact. Column 3 reports the results by cutting the sample period to the 21 years and 33
states represented in my data, and the results are similar. Column 4 reports my replication of
Wolfers (2006) using my data from 1968-1988, and again finds similar results. In sum, these
results show that using a smaller data sample can still derive results similar to the literature;
thus, the various findings in the following sections are mainly driven by the specifications
proposed in this paper.
8Wolfers (2006)’s data can be downloaded from the author’s website (http://users.nber.org/ jwolfers/in-
dex.php).
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3 Methodology
In previous studies, treatments were assigned based on the year of divorce. However, marriages
that dissolved in the same year under unilateral divorce laws are not affected the same way.
Unilateral divorce laws directly reduce the cost of divorce of married couples; meanwhile,
switching to unilateral divorce changes the expectation of single people on marriage stability.
Therefore, the choice of marriage and decision to divorce are both altered for those who
married after the unilateral divorce laws. For those are married when the laws are enacted,
only the divorce decisions are affected. Since unilateral divorce laws affect couples differently,
depending on the year of marriage and year of divorce, the types of marriages can be described
as follow:
Treatmentdsc =

Non-affected if Cohort < UDL & Cohort + d < UDL
Partially affected if Cohort < UDL & Cohort + d ≥ UDL
Fully affected if Cohort ≥ UDL & Cohort + d ≥ UDL
(3)
Cohort refers to the marriage year. A couple that married and divorced before the enact-
ment of UDLs belongs to the non-affected group, since neither marriage nor divorce decisions
were influenced by the UDLs.9 If a couple married before the law but stayed together long
enough for the law to be enacted, they belong to the partially affected group, since only the
divorce decision was affected by the law. If the couple was married under the UDLs, then both
marriage and divorce decisions are exposed to UDLs; thus, they are considered as fully affected.
Non-affected and partially affected couples were married before the reform. The only
difference is that partially affected couples are exposed to lower costs of divorce due to the
9The assumption here and in the rest of this paper is that people do not anticipate the transition to
unilateral divorce.
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unilateral divorce laws. Thus, the difference of cohort risks of divorce between the non-affected
and partially affected groups is the result of the divorce effect of unilateral divorce laws.
Furthermore, the divorce risk of the fully affected group varies from the non-affected group
in two ways. The first difference comes from the divorce effect of unilateral divorce laws on
the divorce decision for similar, partially affected groups. The second is the sorting effect, or
the effect of unilateral divorce laws on the risk of divorce through marital sorting. Therefore,
in order to precisely capture the influences of the unilateral divorce revolution, the effects of
unilateral divorce laws on the risk of divorce are defined as follows:
Divorce Effectdsc =

0 if non-affected
1 if partially or fully affected
(4)
Sorting Effectdsc =

0 if non-affected or partially affected
1 if fully affected
(5)
I employ a difference-in-differences (DD) approach to estimate the impact of unilateral
divorce laws on the marriage cohort risk of divorce, and use the differences in the timing
of states’ enactment of UDLs as a source of exogenous treatment variation. The empirical
analysis is based on reduced form models, expressed as follows:
RiskDivorcedsc = α
d
0 + α
d
11{Divorce Effect} + αd21{Sorting Effect}
+ βds + γ
d
c + δ
d
s ∗ T + udsc
(6)
Marriage duration is fixed for each regression. The outcome variables are the risk of divorce
defined in eq. (1) and eq. (2). 1{Divorce Effect} equals 1 if the divorce decisions were
made under the unilateral divorce laws, while 1{Sorting Effect} equals 1 if the marriage
decisions were made under the new laws. αd1 measures how the risk of divorce of partially
and fully affected cohorts were directly caused by lowering the cost of divorce, while αd2
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captures the effect of unilateral divorce laws on the risk of divorce through marital sorting.
As partially affected cohorts are only affected by the divorce effect, αd1 also measures the
impact of unilateral divorce laws on the partially affected cohorts. For fully affected cohorts,
the total effect of unilateral divorce laws on the risk of divorce equals the sum of sorting
effect and divorce effect, which is the sum of αd1 and α
d
2. Accordingly, the empirical analysis
can be performed as:
RiskDivorcedsc = θ
d
0 + θ
d
11{Partially affected} + θd21{Fully affected}
+ βds + γ
d
c + δ
d
s ∗ T + udsc
(7)
where θd1 equals α
d
1, and θ
d
2 equals α
d
1 plus α
d
2. β
d
s and γ
d
c capture the state-fixed effects
and the marriage year-fixed effects, respectively. Since marriage duration is fixed for each
regression estimation, the marriage year-fixed effects are equivalent to the divorce year-fixed
effects. βds ∗ T is the state-specific linear trend, which captures the states’ varying character-
istics over time. For robustness checks, I estimate (7) without state-specific linear trends and
with state-specific quadratic time trends, both of which will be discussed in the following
sections.
The crude divorce rates under the unilateral divorce laws include the divorces of the
partially affected and the fully affected cohorts. Changes in the crude divorce rates after the
unilateral divorce laws can be attributed to changes in the risk of divorce of these two groups.
Previous studies found that crude divorce rates initially increased and declined afterwards
due to unilateral divorce laws, suggesting that the laws primarily affected the risk of divorce
of those who were married before implementation. Hence, according to the literature, αd1 and
θd1 are expected to be positive, meaning that the existing marriages are more likely to be
dissolved within a given length of marriage. Moreover, θd2 is predicted to be non-positive,
since new marriages formed under the unilateral divorce laws are expected to be unaffected.
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Accordingly, αd2 is expected to be negative.
In order to test the identifying assumption that what happened in the non-reform state
would have occurred in the reform states in the absence of the unilateral divorce laws, I plot
the differences in the cohort risk of divorce between treated and untreated states, conditional
on state and year-fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Plots for the parallel
trends test can be found in Appendix A.3. On the left are the trends for the cumulative
risk of divorce, and the hazard risks of divorce trends are featured on the right. Each row
corresponds to a specific length of marriage. For instance, Figures (e) and (f) illustrate the
cumulative risks of divorce within 4 years of marriage as well as the hazard risk of divorce in
the 4th year of marriage, respectively.
The timevar refers to the gap between the marriage year and the enactment year of the
unilateral divorce laws. For example, zero refers to the cohort that got married when the law
was enacted; negative one and positive one correspond to cohorts that married a year before
and a year after the law was enacted, respectively. The plot to the left of the first vertical
line is the difference between non-reform states and reform states before the enactment of the
law; the plot between the two vertical lines is the difference between marriages in non-reform
states and partially affected marriages in reform states; and the plot to the right of the
second vertical line is the difference between marriages in non-reform states and fully affected
marriages in reform states. The flat trends to the left of the first vertical line show that there
is no difference between non-reform states and reform states prior to the implementation of the
laws; therefore, the underlying assumption is satisfied. In addition, there were no significant
changes in the partially affected cohorts, compared to the non-affected cohorts, suggesting
that the risk of divorce of couples married under traditional divorce laws does not increase
when exposed to lower costs of divorce. Moreover, the flat trends to the left of the second
vertical line imply that people did not respond to the future policy prior to its implementation.
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4 Empirical Analysis
This section features an empirical analysis of the impact of unilateral divorce laws on the risk
of divorce. The main specifications are based on eq. 6 and eq. 7. I discuss the major results
of the paper, followed by discussion of heterogeneity and robustness checks to support the
main findings.
4.1 Main Results
I first examine the effects of unilateral divorce laws on cohorts’ cumulative risks of divorce.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the divorce effects and sorting effects of unilateral divorce laws
on the cumulative risk of divorce. Each column reports the effect of the laws on the risk
of divorce, given a specific marriage length. The cumulative risk of divorce within 6 years
of marriage includes all divorces in the first five years, for instance. If a couple divorces
within a year, the divorce effect cannot be separated from the sorting effect of UDLs since
the marriage and divorce decisions are made in the same year, and thus α1 and α2 cannot
be correctly estimated. Panel B of Table 3 shows the effect of unilateral divorce laws on
the different treated groups. Since partially treated cohorts are only affected by the divorce
effect, the coefficient estimates of the divorce effect and of partially affected groups are iden-
tical, whereas the effects on fully affected cohorts are the sum of the divorce and sorting effects.
The divorce effects of unilateral divorce laws on the cumulative risk of divorce are around
zero within any length of marriages, except for the risk of divorce within 9 years of marriage.10
In the early and late periods of marriage, the divorce effects slightly decrease the cumulative
10By running ten different regressions, the divorce effect on the risks of divorce within 9 years of marriage
could be a false positive.
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Table 3: Cumulative Risks of Divorce
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Divorce within 2yrs 3yrs 4yrs 5yrs 6yrs 7yrs 8yrs 9yrs 10yrs 11yrs
Panel A: by types of effects
Divorce Effect -0.00291 -0.00170 -0.00146 0.00354 0.00492 0.00261 0.00401 0.00692∗ -0.00127 -0.00208
(0.00268) (0.00318) (0.00369) (0.00409) (0.00489) (0.00573) (0.00463) (0.00367) (0.00511) (0.00563)
Sorting Effect 0.00458∗∗ 0.00575∗∗ 0.00703∗ 0.0102∗ 0.0118∗ 0.0139∗∗ 0.0148∗∗ 0.0151∗∗ 0.0178∗∗ 0.0188∗∗
(0.00183) (0.00273) (0.00392) (0.00536) (0.00588) (0.00619) (0.00644) (0.00654) (0.00706) (0.00709)
Panel B: by treated groups
Partially Treated -0.00291 -0.00170 -0.00146 0.00354 0.00492 0.00261 0.00401 0.00692∗ -0.00127 -0.00208
(0.00268) (0.00318) (0.00369) (0.00409) (0.00489) (0.00573) (0.00463) (0.00367) (0.00511) (0.00563)
Fully Treated 0.00167 0.00405 0.00557 0.0137∗∗ 0.0167∗∗ 0.0165∗∗ 0.0188∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0165∗∗ 0.0168∗∗
(0.00360) (0.00405) (0.00457) (0.00541) (0.00604) (0.00664) (0.00681) (0.00687) (0.00679) (0.00728)
Observations 727 700 673 646 619 592 565 538 511 484
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. Weighted by state population.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes : Data source is the Divorce and Marriage file of Vital Statistics. The outcome variable is the cumulative risk of divorce defined in 1. The
The variables of interest are the divorce effect, sorting effect of unilateral divorce laws, and the effect of UDLs on partially affected cohorts and
fully affected cohorts. Each column represents a specific length of marriage. Marriage formed in different years are compared at the same year
of marriage. State- and year-fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends are controlled. The estimates are weighted by state population. If
a marriage dissolves within a year, the divorce and sorting effect on the partially treated cohorts cannot be separated. Thus, divorce within a
year is omitted.
risk of divorce, though not in a statically-significant manner. Given the additional risks in
the later years of marriage, the divorce effect on the cumulative risk of divorce increases
with longer length of marriage and peaks within the first 9 years of marriage. The divorce
effect of UDLs increases the cumulative risk of divorce by 0.69 percentage points, which is
equivalent to a 2.32 percent increase in the cumulative risk of divorce. One would expect a
higher divorce rate when the cost of divorce decreases. However, married couples may not be
affected by lower costs of divorce if the initial match quality is high.
Conditional on the cost of divorce, the risk of divorce is expected to increase when a
marriage becomes fragile. If the initial quality of a marriage is reduced by the unilateral
divorce laws, the cumulative risk of divorce will be higher throughout the earlier and later
periods of marriage. In contrast to the divorce effects, the sorting effects shown in Panel
A Table 3 are positive and significant across any marriage length. The sorting effects of
unilateral divorce laws on the cumulative risk of divorce steadily increase as marriage duration
grows. It increases the cumulative risk of divorce by 0.46 percentage points (column 1) for
marriages that last two years or less, which equivalent to an 8 percent increase in the two-year
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cumulative risk of divorce. The sorting effect of cumulative risk of divorce within 11 years of
marriage (column 10) is about 4 times higher than divorce within 2 years (column 1). Since
the average cumulative risk of divorce within 10 years is 6 times higher than within 2 years, the
percentage increase in the risk of divorce within 11 years caused by the sorting effect is actually
less than that for divorce within 2 years. There is about a 6 percent increase in the cumulative
risk of divorce within 11 years caused by the sorting effects. On average, the sorting effect of
unilateral divorce laws increases the risk of divorce within any length of marriage by 5 percent.
The partially affected cohorts are affected only when deciding to divorce. The zero divorce
effects indicate that, when transitioning to the new divorce law era, the partially affected
cohorts are not worse off than the non-affected cohorts. On the contrary, the non-zero positive
sorting effects suggest that marriages formed under the unilateral divorce laws have higher
cumulative risks of divorce within different length of marriage than partially affected and
non-affected cohorts. Panel B in Table 3 reports the effects of unilateral divorce laws on
partially affected and fully affected marriages, compared to the unaffected marriages. Partially
affected couples have a 2.32 percent higher divorce rate within the first 9 years of marriage
than the unaffected groups, but do not face significantly higher risks of divorce in the rest
years of marriage. Within the first several years, fully affected cohorts are not significantly
influenced by unilateral divorce laws, as the divorce effect and sorting effect cancel each other
out. As marriages last longer, the sorting effect strengthens and gradually surpasses the
divorce effect. Accordingly, the risk of divorce within the first 5 years of marriage increases
by 1.4 percentage points or 7 percent. The effect of UDLs on the cumulative risk of divorce
of fully affected cohorts peaks within the first 9 years of marriage. The cumulative risk of
divorce of fully affected cohorts is 2.2 percentage points higher than the unaffected cohorts.
The higher sorting effects as well as the total effects reveal that fully affected cohorts are
exposed to higher risks of divorce than the other two groups. Moreover, the fact that the
sorting effect is larger than the divorce effect indicates that the increase in divorce risk for
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fully affected marriages is mainly caused by changes in the initial marriage quality.
Table 4: Hazard Risks of Divorce
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Divorce at 2nd yr 3rd yr 4th yr 5th yr 6th yr 7th yr 8th yr 9th yr 10th yr 11th yr
Panel A: by types of effects
Divorce Effect -0.00136 0.000101 0.000684 0.00102 0.00120 0.00184 0.000981 0.00360∗∗∗ 0.000622 0.00122∗
(0.00193) (0.00188) (0.00136) (0.00148) (0.00134) (0.00117) (0.00120) (0.000786) (0.000635) (0.000698)
Sorting Effect 0.00239∗ 0.00200 0.00160 0.00284 0.00120 0.00136 -0.0000685 -0.000265 0.000884 0.000953
(0.00134) (0.00191) (0.00208) (0.00215) (0.00163) (0.00151) (0.00169) (0.00148) (0.00143) (0.00105)
Panel B: by treated groups
Partially Treated -0.00136 0.000101 0.000684 0.00102 0.00120 0.00184 0.000981 0.00360∗∗∗ 0.000622 0.00122∗
(0.00193) (0.00188) (0.00136) (0.00148) (0.00134) (0.00117) (0.00120) (0.000786) (0.000635) (0.000698)
Fully Treated 0.00103 0.00210 0.00228∗ 0.00386∗ 0.00240 0.00320∗ 0.000913 0.00334∗ 0.00151 0.00217∗∗
(0.00199) (0.00154) (0.00133) (0.00213) (0.00205) (0.00177) (0.00238) (0.00196) (0.00160) (0.000868)
Observations 727 700 673 646 619 592 565 538 511 484
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. Weighted by state population.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Data source is the Divorce and Marriage file of Vital Statistics. The outcome variable is the hazard risk of divorce defined in 2. The The
variables of interest are the divorce effect, sorting effect of unilateral divorce laws, and the effect of UDLs on partially affected cohorts and fully
affected cohorts. Each column represents a specific length of marriage. Marriage formed in different years are compared at the same year of marriage.
State- and year-fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends are controlled. The estimates are weighted by state population. If a marriage
dissolves within a year, the divorce and sorting effect on the partially affected cohorts cannot be separated. Thus, divorce within a year is omitted.
Table 4 reports the impact of unilateral divorce laws on the hazard risk of divorce as
defined in eq. 2. There is little divorce effect in the early years of marriage, and only a
slightly higher hazard risk of divorce during the later years of marriage. Sorting effects
increase the hazard risks of divorce during the early years of marriage and have zero impact
during the later years. Unstable matches among the newly-formed marriages dissolve fast
due to unilateral divorce laws during the early periods. Once unstable marriages dissolved,
the hazard risk of divorce is lower. On average, the sorting effect increases the hazard risk of
divorce in each of the first 5 years by 4.5 percent.11
As for the partially affected couples, the divorce effect has no impact on the risk of
divorce in a single year of marriage. In contrast, fully affected couples have higher risks
of divorce during early and later years of marriage. Early-year hazard risks of divorce are
11Though only divorce during the second year was statistically increased by the sorting effect of unilateral
divorce laws, I cannot reject that the coefficient estimates for the second, third, forth and fifth years of
marriage are different at the 5 percent significance level.
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mainly attributed to the sorting effects, while later-year divorces are mostly caused by the
divorce effects. Unilateral divorce laws grant a divorce without requiring proof of fault or
spousal consent. If people take UDLs as insurance for unstable marriages, and are more likely
to enter or re-enter a riskier marriage under unilateral divorce laws, it will lead to higher
risks of divorce and faster divorces. Unstable marriages are washed out when marriages are
still young, and marriages that survived the shaky years are typically better matched. Even
for the relatively better matched couples, however, the risk of divorce in the later years of
marriage is still increased due to the lower cost of divorce. There are higher hazard risks
of divorce during the 7th, 9th, and 11th years of marriage for couples married after the law
compare to those who were not affected. This implies that, the threshold for a couple staying
together is increased by unilateral divorce laws, ceteris paribus.
4.2 Interpretation
The partially affected cohorts are married prior to and divorced after the reform. Thus,
the marriage decisions of partially affected couples are not affected by UDLs, assuming
no anticipation of the reform; on the other hand, decisions about exiting a marriage were
affected. Conditional on the initial match quality, I find that reducing the cost of divorce has
no significant impact on the risk of divorce, especially for partially affected cohorts. This
indicates that marriages formed before the unilateral divorce reform have a high enough
quality that even when exposed to lower costs of divorce, their rate of divorce does not
increase. Fully affected marriages have much higher cumulative and hazard risks of divorce
than the partially affected couples due to the sorting effect, suggesting that unilateral divorce
induces more unstable marriages.
My results confirm that marriages formed after UDLs are different from marriages formed
previously. Cohorts formed before UDLs face similar risks of divorce, regardless of divorce
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regime. However, UDLs increase the risk of divorce of marriages formed after the law,
especially through marital sorting. Unilateral divorce laws are expected to influence marriage
stability in two ways. First, the direct and immediate effect of switching to unilateral divorce
reduces the cost of divorce for married couples. Marriages exposed to UDLs are allowed to file
for divorce without proof of fault or spousal consent. Consequently, switching to unilateral
divorce law change the likelihood of divorce altogether. Second, the easier divorce environment
has different impact on individuals with different preference of marriage. Individuals who
dislike making commitments or who are afraid of being trapped in an unstable marriage
possess a lower marriage entry threshold due to UDLs. However, people who are serious
about marriage may have been deterred to marry since there is a higher probability that
their future spouse will file for divorce.
The unilateral divorce laws change the costs and benefits of marriage, but not equally
across all individuals. Individuals who know they are likely to make poor marriage decisions
or be poor partners see a large increase in the value of marriage – they can easily dissolve
their mistakes. This increases the number of unstable marriages that are formed, and the pool
of “bad partners” in the dating pool. Individuals who are good partners or unlikely to make
a poor marriage decision see almost no direct benefit. But the fact that there are now more
“bad partners” in the dating pool creates an indirect cost which could cause some individuals
to delay or forego marriage. As shown in Rasul (2004), unilateral divorce laws cause a
reduction in marriage rate. Results on the fully affected cohorts indicate that UDLs increase
the likelihood of divorce of newlyweds and create more reckless marriages though martial
sorting. Together with findings in Rasul (2004), the higher risk of divorce among newly
formed marriages is more likely to be induced by the fact that “good partners” delay marriage
and that there are more “bad partners” in each newly formed marriage cohort. Consequently,
the unilateral divorce laws altered the composition of marriage, which is captured by the
sorting effects in the empirical analysis. Furthermore, changes in the marriage composition
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alter the risk of divorce in the long-run, since riskier marriages result in higher probabilities
of dissolution.
Based on the effect of the UDLs on the hazard risk of divorce, I further calculate how
much of the increase in the overall divorce rate caused by UDLs in the first two years following
the enactment is attributed to the sorting effect. Because the range of my sample is 11 years
of marriage, the oldest cohort impacted by the divorce effect are those who married nine years
prior and divorced during the first year of the enactment of the UDLs. Similar iterations
apply to other younger cohorts.12 In general, in the first two years following the enactment
of the law, there are 10 cohorts in my sample that are affected by the UDLs through the
divorce effect, while 3 cohorts are affected through the sorting effect. According to Table 4, I
find that 31 percent increase in the divorce caused by UDLs in the first two years after the
enactment is attributed to the sorting effect, indicating that marriages formed after the law
contribute a significant amount to the initial increase in the overall divorce rate.
4.3 Unilateral Divorce Impact on Characteristics of Marriage
In order to investigate how unilateral divorce affects marital sorting, I further examine how
marriage characteristics change after the revolution and separately evaluate the marriage
characteristics for white marriages13. Evidence of how unilateral divorce laws affect marriage
characteristics are presented in Table 5. The marriage characteristics of each cohort are
measured on three dimensions and by gender: average age at marriage of the groom and
bride, age gap and the absolute value between the groom and bride, and the rate of remarried
grooms and brides. Panel A of Table 5 reports the effects of unilateral divorce laws on the
marriage characteristics of white couples. Panel B reports the effects on all racial and ethnic
12For example, couples that married a year before the law can divorce in the first year of the enactment of
the law, which is equivalent to divorce in the second year of marriage.
13Due to data limitation, I cannot look at other races individually
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groups. According to column 1 and 2 in panel A, the average groom age and bride age of
white couples are increased by 0.32 and 0.23 years, respectively, though this increase is not
statistically significant for brides. Meanwhile, the average age gap between white grooms
and white brides are widened by 0.09 years (column 3), implying that white grooms are 0.09
years older than white brides under the unilateral divorce era. The absolute average age
gap shown in column 4 measures the dissimilarity of spouses disregarding gender. It shows
that, on average, whites are more likely to marry with someone much younger or older than
themselves. Compared to the age characteristics of white marriages, the increases in the
groom and bride ages of the overall marriages are about 0.16 and 0.11 years, respectively,
which are less than half of the increase of age for white marriages. In addition, the disparity
in the spousal age gap is much smaller for overall marriages than white marriages: 0.045
years increase for grooms and 0.062 years increase in the dissimilarity between spouses. The
last two columns feature how unilateral divorce laws affect remarriages. Results for white
marriages show that the remarriage rate of grooms, regardless of the marital history of the
bride, increases by 2.4 percentage points or 7.6 percent. A similar increase is identified
for white brides. Nonetheless, the evidence on the remarriage rate of grooms and brides is
limited to whites. The increases in the age of grooms and brides at marriage can also be
attributed to increased remarriage rates due to UDLs. The effects of unilateral divorce laws
on marriage characteristics provide evidence about changes in the marriage composition,
particularly for white marriages. Unilateral divorce laws increase the likelihood of remarriage
among white couples, while second marriages and beyond are correlated with older grooms
and brides. Older white men are more likely to get remarried due to unilateral divorce laws,
and remarried white people are more likely to marry someone significantly older or younger
than themselves. Additional evidence is required to answer who sorts into marriage and who
marries whom. However, these questions are beyond the focus of this study. Future work
will investiage on the effect of UDLs on the marriage composition.
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Table 5: Marriage Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Avg. groom age Avg. bride age Avg. age gap Avg. absolute age gap Rate of remarried groom Rate of remarried bride
Panel A: characteristics of white couples
UDL 0.323∗ 0.230 0.0929∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.0235∗∗ 0.0202∗
(0.183) (0.165) (0.0326) (0.0505) (0.0107) (0.0105)
Observations 625 625 625 625 625 625
Panel B: characteristics of all couples
UDL 0.155∗ 0.110 0.0451 0.0624∗∗ 0.00755 0.00275
(0.0856) (0.0814) (0.0298) (0.0293) (0.00599) (0.00666)
Observations 754 754 754 754 754 754
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes : The outcome variables describe characteristics of marriage formed in different years. Data source is the Marriage file of Vital Statistics.
Outcome variables from column 1 to 6 are: (1) average age of groom at the year of marriage, (2) average age of bride at the year of marriage, (3)
average age gap between groom and bride, (4) absolute value of average age gap between groom and bride, (5) percentage of grooms that are
not at first marriage, (6) percentage of bride that are not at first marriage. The sample includes all marriages, including the first marriages and
higher marriages. Dependent variable is a dummy that equals to 1 if unilateral divorce laws presents at the year of marriage and equals to 0
otherwise. Results in Panel A are for only white marriages, while Panel B are for all racial and ethnic groups. State- and year-fixed effects and
linear state-specific time trends are controlled. States without fully observed divorce file from 1968-1995 are dropped in order to be consistent with
previous results.
4.4 Heterogeneous Reactions to Unilateral Divorce Laws
As discussed, unilateral divorce laws have a strong impact on the risk of divorce through
marital sorting. Marriages began under UDLs have higher risk of divorce than those formed
before. There are different factors that can affect how marriage reacts to the unilateral
divorce revolution. For instance, people from liberal states may have higher desire to marry
and divorce, and thus unilateral divorce laws differentially affect marriage stability in these
state than in less liberal states. The marriage characteristices of whites are more affected
by UDLs than the overall marriages. Therefore, states with more white marriages may be
affected by the unilateral divorce laws differently. In this section, the heterogeneous reactions
of marriages from a variety of reform states are discussed.
I first use the DW-NOMINATE score to evaluate how conservative/liberal the state
is.14 DW-NOMINATE scores have been widely used to describe the political ideology of
politicians, political parties, and political institutions. Nominate is a two-dimensional scaling
application. The first dimension evaluates government intervention in the economy or the
14More information regarding DW-NOMINATE scores is available at https://legacy.voteview.com/
dwnomin.htm and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NOMINATE_(scaling_method).
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liberal-conservative spectrum of the modern era. The second dimension features the slavery
conflict between Northern and Southern states prior to the Civil War as well as the Civil
Rights debate from the late 1930s through the mid-1970s. After 1980 there is considerable
evidence that the South realigns and the second dimension is no longer relevant. I use the
average of the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE scores of each state’s U.S. senators to
calculate the DW-score of the state. States with a score in the first dimension closer to 1 are
described as conservative, whereas a score closer to -1 are described as liberal. A score of
zero or close to zero is described as politically moderate.
Table 6: Risks of Divorce and Conservativeness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Divorce within 2yrs 3yrs 4yrs 5yrs 6yrs 7yrs 8yrs 9yrs 10yrs 11yrs
Panel A: Cumulative divorce rates
Divorce Effect -0.00229 -0.000731 -0.000244 0.00516 0.00578 0.00320 0.00471 0.00725 0.00121 0.00427
(0.00247) (0.00354) (0.00353) (0.00594) (0.00857) (0.00843) (0.00799) (0.00660) (0.00731) (0.00927)
Sorting Effect 0.00462∗∗ 0.00528∗ 0.00635 0.00876 0.0104∗ 0.0126∗ 0.0134∗∗ 0.0139∗∗ 0.0169∗∗ 0.0174∗∗
(0.00200) (0.00297) (0.00383) (0.00521) (0.00583) (0.00613) (0.00635) (0.00626) (0.00648) (0.00672)
Divorce Effect ×DW-Score 0.00313 0.00207 0.00193 0.00320 0.000627 0.000856 0.00177 0.000773 0.00629 0.0181
(0.00626) (0.00620) (0.00724) (0.0134) (0.0168) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0202) (0.0214)
Sorting Effect × DW-Score 0.00310 0.00278 0.00445 0.00164 0.00286 0.00109 0.000444 0.00521 0.00936 0.00300
(0.00582) (0.00823) (0.0105) (0.0133) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0141) (0.0163)
DW-Score -0.00960∗∗ -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0154∗∗ -0.0169∗ -0.0169 -0.0160 -0.0156 -0.0163∗ -0.0170∗∗ -0.0181∗∗
(0.00386) (0.00435) (0.00609) (0.00875) (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.00919) (0.00801) (0.00734) (0.00837)
Panel B: Hazard divorce rates
Divorce Effect -0.00155 -0.000554 0.000478 0.000806 -0.0000138 0.000939 -0.000539 0.00165 0.00236 0.000681
(0.00180) (0.00200) (0.00139) (0.00264) (0.00253) (0.00207) (0.00206) (0.00139) (0.00170) (0.00114)
Sorting Effect 0.00271∗ 0.00218 0.00168 0.00264 0.00127 0.00137 -0.0000951 -0.000165 0.000526 0.000990
(0.00156) (0.00205) (0.00201) (0.00207) (0.00163) (0.00152) (0.00163) (0.00136) (0.00131) (0.000999)
Divorce Effect ×DW-Score -0.00204 -0.00562 -0.00228 -0.000920 -0.00385 -0.00240 -0.00393 -0.00522 0.00451 -0.00159
(0.00456) (0.00338) (0.00359) (0.00747) (0.00493) (0.00412) (0.00415) (0.00390) (0.00465) (0.00252)
Sorting Effect × DW-Score 0.00427 0.00466 0.00421 0.000143 0.00368 0.000341 0.000734 0.00525∗ -0.000744 0.00246
(0.00448) (0.00466) (0.00455) (0.00564) (0.00287) (0.00203) (0.00252) (0.00290) (0.00293) (0.00238)
DW-Score -0.00534∗∗ -0.00451∗ -0.00464 -0.00248 -0.00172 -0.000150 -0.000825 -0.00284 -0.00290 -0.00174
(0.00251) (0.00225) (0.00345) (0.00391) (0.00256) (0.00208) (0.00175) (0.00172) (0.00246) (0.00165)
Observations 727 700 673 646 619 592 565 538 511 484
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Data source is the Divorce and Marriage file of Vital Statistics and DW-NOMINATE score of senator estimates. The outcome variable is
cumulative risks of divorce in Panel A and hazard risks of divorce in Panel B. The interesting variables are divorce effect, sorting effect of unilateral
divorce laws, and interactions with DW-Score. Each column represents a specific length of marriage. State- and cohort-year-fixed effects and linear
state-specific time trends are controlled. The estimates are weighted by state population. If a marriage dissolves within a year, the divorce effect and
sorting effect of the partially affected cohorts cannot be separated. Thus, divorce within a year is omitted. The third and forth row in each panel report
the how divorce effect and sorting effect, respectively, affect states with different degree of conservative differently.
Table 6 reports how states react differently to unilateral divorce laws based on how
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conservative they are. More conservative states have lower cumulative as well as hazard
risks of divorce. However, there is little evidence that the reaction to unilateral divorce laws
varies across states of different DW-scores. The coefficient estimates of the interaction terms
in Table 6 show that marriages from more conservative states experience slightly higher
cumulative risks of divorce than marriages from more liberal states, but the differences are
not statistically different from zero. Similar results are found for the hazard risks of divorce,
indicating that the effects of unilateral divorce laws on the risk of divorce are not driven by
liberal states.
Next I examine the heterogeneous reactions of states with more white marriages to
unilateral divorce laws. Farley and Bianchi (1987) finds that whites marry at younger ages
than blacks, and black women are less likely than white women to remarry after a divorce.
Sexual disparity in income is much smaller among blacks than among whites. Bulanda
and Brown (2007) finds that black marriages have lower quality than other races and face
higher odds of marital disruption. Raley et al. (2015) shows that black women marry later
in life are less likely to marry, and have higher rates of martial instability. Other mar-
riage and divorce patterns, such as employment and economic independence, have been
discussed as well. The evidence from the previous studies indicates disparities in marriage
quality and stability among different racial and ethnic groups. Hence, it is reasonable to
postulate heterogeneous responses among different racial groups when switching to unilat-
eral divorce laws. Due to the data limitation, I perform the empirical analysis based on
the percentage of white marriages of each marriage cohort in each state and interact the
percentage of white marriages with the effects of unilateral divorce laws on the risks of divorce.
An analysis of how states with more white couples are affected by unilateral divorce laws
differently from states with less white couples is presented in Table 7.15 The white share is
15The analysis of other racial and ethnic groups, such as black and Hispanic couples, cannot be conducted
due to data limitations. The Marriage Data of Vital Statistics does not provide sufficient data on Hispanic
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Table 7: Risk of Divorce Among White Couples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Divorce within 2yrs 3yrs 4yrs 5yrs 6yrs 7yrs 8yrs 9yrs 10yrs 11yrs
Panel A: Cumulative divorce rates
Divorce Effect 0.0353∗∗∗ 0.0446∗∗∗ 0.0347∗ 0.0203 0.0262 0.0267 0.0293 0.0292 0.0133 0.000482
(0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0179) (0.0331) (0.0548) (0.0578) (0.0602) (0.0645) (0.0687) (0.0720)
Sorting Effect -0.00351 -0.00382 0.00719 0.0107 0.00536 0.0102 0.00662 0.0107 0.0110 0.0169
(0.0121) (0.0159) (0.0246) (0.0349) (0.0468) (0.0499) (0.0551) (0.0590) (0.0646) (0.0664)
Divorce Effect × White Share -0.0369∗∗∗ -0.0450∗∗∗ -0.0328 -0.0142 -0.0207 -0.0161 -0.0210 -0.0168 -0.00249 0.0156
(0.0116) (0.0120) (0.0208) (0.0359) (0.0563) (0.0578) (0.0609) (0.0657) (0.0711) (0.0737)
Sorting Effect × White Share 0.0113 0.0149 0.00508 0.00412 0.0118 0.00978 0.0137 0.00937 0.0105 0.00324
(0.0131) (0.0182) (0.0285) (0.0399) (0.0528) (0.0559) (0.0617) (0.0661) (0.0725) (0.0743)
White Share 0.0106 0.0116 0.00337 -0.0108 -0.0165 -0.0220 -0.0254 -0.0241 -0.0315 -0.0325
(0.00877) (0.0116) (0.0133) (0.0162) (0.0180) (0.0198) (0.0203) (0.0207) (0.0199) (0.0201)
Panel B: Hazard divorce rates
Divorce Effect 0.0313∗∗∗ 0.0214∗∗ 0.0114 0.00825 0.0157 0.0227 0.0366∗ 0.0114 0.0200 0.0119
(0.00629) (0.0102) (0.0143) (0.0134) (0.0181) (0.0141) (0.0209) (0.0119) (0.0139) (0.0112)
Sorting Effect -0.0150∗ -0.0148 -0.00638 -0.0112 -0.00855 -0.00501 -0.0198 -0.00586 -0.0130 -0.000814
(0.00830) (0.0161) (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0116) (0.0173) (0.0104) (0.0138) (0.00948)
Divorce Effect × White Share -0.0323∗∗∗ -0.0203 -0.0103 -0.00660 -0.0156 -0.0198 -0.0390∗ -0.00837 -0.0209 -0.0101
(0.00712) (0.0119) (0.0161) (0.0151) (0.0183) (0.0141) (0.0216) (0.0122) (0.0143) (0.0116)
Sorting Effect × White Share 0.0198∗ 0.0191 0.00935 0.0160 0.0115 0.00933 0.0230 0.00768 0.0160 0.00320
(0.00983) (0.0185) (0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0162) (0.0130) (0.0194) (0.0116) (0.0154) (0.0105)
White Share 0.00557 0.00198 -0.00818 -0.0109∗ -0.00327 -0.0000611 -0.00273 -0.00324 -0.00183 0.00345
(0.00563) (0.00608) (0.00478) (0.00528) (0.00461) (0.00337) (0.00262) (0.00274) (0.00358) (0.00307)
Observations 604 583 561 539 517 495 473 451 429 407
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes : Data source is the Divorce and Marriage file of Vital Statistics. The outcome variable is cumulative risks of divorce in Panel A and hazard risks of
divorce in Panel B. The interesting variables are divorce effect, sorting effect of unilateral divorce laws, and the interactions with the share of white
couples in each marriage cohort. Each column represents a specific length of marriage. State- and year-fixed effects and linear state-specific time trends
are controlled. The estimates are weighted by state population. If a marriage dissolves within a year, the divorce effect and sorting effect of the partially
affected cohorts cannot be separated. Thus, divorce within a year is omitted. The third and forth row in each panel report the how divorce effect and
sorting effect, respectively, affect states with different share of white couples differently. The reason for using percentage of white couples in each marital
cohort is that the share of black marriage in some states are extremely low and tends to be under-reported; there is no information of race for other
non-white-non-black racial and ethnic groups.
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defined as the percentage of marriages in which both spouses are whites in each marriage
cohort. States with more white couples have slightly lower cumulative and hazard risks of
divorce than those with smaller proportions of white couples, though the difference is not
statistically significant. Cohorts with more white couples are less responsive to the divorce
effect of UDLs during the first couple years of marriage. The difference in response to the
divorce effect between states with more white couples and those with less shrinks during the
later years of marriage for both cumulative and hazard risks of divorce. States with more
white couples are more responsive to the sorting effect, though not statistically significant.
The sorting effects on states with less white couples are close to zero. However, the joint test
on the overall sorting effects on states with more whites couples are positive and significantly
different from zero. For instance, the sorting effect increases the cumulative risk of divorce of
states with more white couples by 1.5 percentage points within 5 years, with a 10 percent
significance level.
4.5 Robustness
In this section, several specifications are applied as robustness checks on the main results. The
first concern is the inclusion of linear state-specific time trends in a DD approach. Wolfers
(2006) mentioned the sensitivity of the estimates of Friedberg (1998) to state-specific trends.
Friedberg (1998) found large and significant effects of unilateral divorce laws on divorce
rates only with the inclusion of state-specific linear time trends.16 Since this study employs
the same DD estimations, and the main specification also includes linear state-specific time
trends, Table 10 - 13 in Appendix A.2 provides robustness checks for the main results with
different specifications of state-specific time trend.
Without assuming any state-specific trend, divorce effects on cumulative risks of divorce
marriages, and black marriages were underreported in the 1960s and 1970s.
16The coefficient estimates are similar when state-specific quadratic time trends are included in Friedberg
(1998).
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ranged from zero to slightly negative, implying that the partially affected cohorts do not
have a higher risk of divorce than the non-affected cohorts. In fact, the cumulative risk of
divorce is lower for partially affected cohorts than non-affected cohorts when a marriage lasts
longer. Sorting effects, on the other hand, are positive and significantly affect the risk of
divorce within 6 years or less. So fully affected cohorts are more likely than partially affected
marriage cohorts to divorce within the first 6 years of marriage. However, given that divorce
effects and sorting effects cancel out each other, the cumulative risk of divorce of fully affected
cohorts is not higher than the non-affected cohorts. Divorce effects and sorting effects on
hazard divorce rates exhibit similar patterns as for the cumulative risk of divorce. Divorce
effects reduce hazard divorce rates, meaning that partially affected marriages have lower
hazard risk of divorce than non-affected marriages. Positive sorting effects suggest that fully
affected cohorts face higher hazard divorce rates than the partially affected during early years
of marriage. These are consistent with the main results discussed in previous sections.
The next robustness check allows for state-specific quadratic time trends to the main
specifications. These results are reported in Appendix A.2 Table 12 for cumulative divorce
rates and Table 13 for hazard divorce rates. The patterns of divorce and sorting effects
with additional quadratic state-specific time trends are very similar to estimates with linear
state-specific time trends, but with slightly different magnitude. Results with different
specifications for the state-specific time trends show that the main results are robust based
on different assumptions of state-specific trends. In fact, no state-specific trend is intrinsically
problematic since the omitted unobserved variables vary within a state and may bias the
estimation, whereas a state-specific quadratic time trend is often too strong of an assumption.
For example, within a state, people may have different attitudes and tastes toward marriage
and divorce that change over the time and are affected by legal reforms. These unobserved
characteristics could correlate with the risk of divorce linearly or otherwise.
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The second concern stems from the structure of the sample. Since the Divorce file and
Marriage file of Vital Statistics are available only from 1968-1995, the youngest ten marriage
cohorts cannot be fully observed for the first 10 years of marriage. For instance, marriage
cohort of 1990 only has a marriage history of the first 5 years, while cohort 1995 only has
a marriage history of the first 12 months. Hence, the number of cohorts declines when the
length of marriages examined increases. To show the results are not driven by changing
samples, I apply the main specification of a DD approach to a restricted sample – cohort
1968 to cohort 1985 – so that the full history of the first 10 years of each marriage cohorts in
the estimation are recorded. Table 14 and 15 show that the divorce and sorting affects of
unilateral divorce laws on the restricted sample are very similar to the main results, which
confirms the robustness of the main results based on a larger, unbalanced panel data.
The third test is conducted to check the robustness of the effects of unilateral divorce laws
on the risks of divorce unweighted by state population. Following the method of (Wolfers,
2006), the main results are weighted by the state annual population. The main concern here
is that the results are driven by large states, such as California, with large populations. If
unilateral divorce laws have the same impact on marriages from different states, the regression
estimates from the main specification should be robust in the absence of weighted state
population. Table 16 and 17 report the effects of unilateral divorce laws on cohort risks of
divorce, without weighted by state population. As expected, the effects on treated cohorts
are consistent with previous findings.
Another concern regarding the robustness of the main results is that the partially affected
cohorts of marriage from different years are affected differently by the unilateral divorce laws.
For example, the 1973 and 1975 marriage cohorts that divorce in their 5th years are both
partially affected in Wisconsin, where unilateral divorce laws were enacted in 1977 (Voena,
2015). However, the 1975 couples were affected by the law for 3 years in the marriage at the
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time of divorce, and it is only 1 year for the 1973 cohort. The length of marriage affected
by the laws may affect marriage stability differently. The effect of years being exposed to
unilateral divorce laws in marriage on the risks of divorce of partially treated cohorts are
presented in Table 18. Partially affected cohorts that are exposed to UDLs with more years
in marriage have higher cumulative risks of divorce than those with fewer years. The same
approach is applied to hazard divorce rates. The divorce effect on the hazard risks of divorce
are not altered by omitting the years of being exposed.
5 Conclusion
This study attempts to identify how unilateral divorce laws affect the risk of divorce through
two different mechanisms. Previous studies examined a similar question about the effect of
unilateral divorce laws on the crude divorce rates. Some found positive effects, and others
found zero impact on the likelihood of divorce. Unilateral divorce laws reduce the cost
of divorce in the short term; more importantly, the lower cost of divorce may affect the
composition of marriages in the long term. Crude divorce rates treat couples married under
different legal regimes the same, and thus ignore heterogeneous mechanisms.
I find that switching to unilateral divorce law induced higher risks of divorce among
marriages formed after unilateral divorce laws - the fully affected cohorts. The risk of divorce
for fully affected cohorts in the first 11 years of marriage is 1.68 percentage points higher
than those for non-affected couples. Unilateral divorce laws also allow faster divorce among
newlyweds. Once the marriage is undesired by one spouse, it can be dissolved immediately.
There is no strong evidence that marriages existing at the time the law is enacted are more
likely than unaffected cohorts to dissolve. In addition, evidence shows that fully affected
cohorts have a higher risk of divorce than partially affected cohorts. Fully treated couples are
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affected by unilateral divorce laws differently than partially affected couples in the selection
of marriage. I find that changes in self-selection into marriage is the major cause of increase
in the risk of divorce. Thus, by examining the effects of unilateral divorce laws on the cohort
risk of divorce, this paper is consistent with previous findings that unilateral divorce laws
induce more divorces. In addition, this paper provides evidence that the rise in the risk
of divorce is mainly attributable to high marital disruption among new marriages. In the
long term, when all non-affected and partially affected cohorts are eventually washed out,
the crude divorce rates examined in the previous studies will be attributed to the marriages
formed under the unilateral divorce era. Unilateral divorce laws have a profound impact on
the family structures in the long run.
Although this study makes important contributions to the understanding of how unilateral
divorce laws affect marriages, it also has several limitations. For example, suitable data on
only 27 states were available. Future research should confirm and expand upon this study
with larger data samples. Another limitation of this paper is that it does not answer directly
how unilateral divorce laws affect who seeks marriage and who marries whom. In order to
correctly evaluate the effect of unilateral divorce laws in the long term, it is imperative to
understand how the legal reform changes marriage sorting in the first place.
Despite its limitations, this study contributes to the growing evidence of our understanding
of changes in the family structure caused by unilateral divorce laws. This empirical analysis
provides a novel perspective that has been neglected in previous studies: the impact of
unilateral divorce laws on the risks of divorce through marital sorting. In addition to
eliminating unhealthy marriages, policy makers should also consider how to encourage healthy
marriages. Future studies of UDLs, and divorce laws in general, must take into account the
impact on family structure in evaluating their welfare effects.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Appendix
Table 8: State Information: Unilateral Divorce Laws
Wolfers (2006) Gruber (2004) Friedberg (1998) Voena (2015)
Alabama* 1971 1971 1971 1971
Alaska* 1935 1935 no pre-1967
Arizona 1973 1973 1973 1973
Arkansas no no no no
California*† 1970 1970 1970 1970
Colorado 19671 1972 1971 1972
Connecticut* 1973 1973 1973 1973
Delaware*† no 1968 no 1968
District of Colunmbia*† no no no no
Florida 1971 1971 1971 1971
Georgia* 1973 1973 1973 1973
Hawaii* 1973 1972 1973 1972
Idaho* 1971 1971 1971 1971
Illinois* no no no no
Indiana 1973 1973 1973 1973
Iowa* 1970 1970 1970 1970
Kansas* 1969 1969 1969 1969
Kentucky* 1972 1972 1972 1972
Louisiana no no no no
Maine 1973 1973 1973 1973
Maryland* no no no no
Massachusetts*† 1975 1975 1975 1975
Michigan* 1972 972 1972 1972
Minnesota 1974 1974 1974 1974
Mississippi no no no no
Missouri* no no no no
Montana* 1975 1973 1975 1973
Nebraska* 1972 1972 1972 1972
Nevada 1973 1967 1973 1967
* are states from the data sample.
† are states with missing years that were dropped from empirical analysis.
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Table 9: State Information, Continued
Wolfers (2006) Gruber (2004) Friedberg (1998) Voena (2015)
New Hampshire*† 1971 1971 1971 1971
New Jersey* no no no no
New Mexico 1973 1933 1973 1973
New York no no no no
North Carolina no no no no
North Dakota 1971 1971 1971 1971
Ohio* no no no 1992
Oklahoma 1953 1953 no pre-1967
Oregon* 1973 1971 1973 1971
Pennsylvania* no no no no
Rhode Island* 1976 1975 1976 1975
South Carolina*† no no no no
South Dakota* 1985 1985 1985 1985
Tennessee* no no no no
Texas 1974 1970 1974 1970
Utah* no 1987 1987
Vermont* no no no no
Virginia* no no no no
Washington 1973 1973 1973 1973
West Virginia no no no 1984
Wisconsin* no 1978 no 1978
Wyoming* 1977 1977 1977 1977
* are states from the data sample.
† are states with missing years that were dropped from the empirical analysis.
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A.2 Robustness Check
Table 10: Cumulative Risks of Divorce: Non State-Specific Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Divorce within 2yrs 3yrs 4yrs 5yrs 6yrs 7yrs 8yrs 9yrs 10yrs 11yrs
Panel A: by types of effects
Divorce Effect -0.00439 -0.00487 -0.00725 -0.00929 -0.0127 -0.0162 -0.0168∗ -0.0176 -0.0234∗ -0.0248∗∗
(0.00423) (0.00558) (0.00770) (0.00807) (0.00823) (0.00986) (0.00923) (0.0107) (0.0122) (0.0117)
Sorting Effect 0.00683∗∗∗ 0.00993∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗ 0.0159∗∗ 0.0143∗ 0.0121 0.0111 0.00967 0.00904
(0.00231) (0.00326) (0.00464) (0.00637) (0.00692) (0.00754) (0.00807) (0.00880) (0.00948) (0.00981)
Panel B: by treated group
Partially Treated -0.00439 -0.00487 -0.00725 -0.00929 -0.0127 -0.0162 -0.0168∗ -0.0176 -0.0234∗ -0.0248∗∗
(0.00423) (0.00558) (0.00770) (0.00807) (0.00823) (0.00986) (0.00923) (0.0107) (0.0122) (0.0117)
Fully Treated 0.00244 0.00506 0.00570 0.00703 0.00323 -0.00184 -0.00471 -0.00644 -0.0137 -0.0158
(0.00380) (0.00487) (0.00595) (0.00552) (0.00585) (0.00792) (0.00904) (0.0116) (0.0143) (0.0154)
Observations 727 700 673 646 619 592 565 538 511 484
State, cohort fixed effect are controlled
Standard errors in parentheses, cluster by state, weighted by state population
States with missing year obs are dropped
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 11: Hazard Risks of Divorce: Non State-Specific Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Divorce at 2nd yr 3rd yr 4th yr 5th yr 6th yr 7th yr 8th yr 9th yr 10th yr 11th yr
Panel A: by types of effects
Divorce Effect -0.00260 -0.00190 -0.00199 -0.00436 -0.00350 -0.00226 -0.00216∗ -0.00165 -0.00266∗∗ -0.00186
(0.00300) (0.00269) (0.00271) (0.00262) (0.00247) (0.00188) (0.00126) (0.00179) (0.00117) (0.00117)
Sorting Effect 0.00416∗∗ 0.00394∗∗ 0.00302 0.00387∗ 0.00207 0.000531 -0.000595 -0.0000592 0.0000555 0.000445
(0.00156) (0.00170) (0.00200) (0.00216) (0.00181) (0.00147) (0.00132) (0.00156) (0.00142) (0.00123)
Panel B: by treated group
Partially Treated -0.00260 -0.00190 -0.00199 -0.00436 -0.00350 -0.00226 -0.00216∗ -0.00165 -0.00266∗∗ -0.00186
(0.00300) (0.00269) (0.00271) (0.00262) (0.00247) (0.00188) (0.00126) (0.00179) (0.00117) (0.00117)
Fully Treated 0.00156 0.00204 0.00103 -0.000488 -0.00143 -0.00173 -0.00275∗ -0.00171 -0.00260∗ -0.00141
(0.00243) (0.00188) (0.00188) (0.00159) (0.00188) (0.00166) (0.00153) (0.00191) (0.00148) (0.00129)
Observations 727 700 673 646 619 592 565 538 511 484
State, cohort fixed effect are controlled
Standard errors in parentheses, cluster by state, weighted by state population
States with missing year obs are dropped
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 12: Cumulative Risks of Divorce: Linear and Quadratic State-Specific Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Divorce within 2yrs 3yrs 4yrs 5yrs 6yrs 7yrs 8yrs 9yrs 10yrs 11yrs
Panel A: by types of effects
Divorce Effect 0.00146 0.00440 0.00643 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0180∗∗ 0.00743 0.00525 0.00907∗∗ -0.00715 -0.00950
(0.00241) (0.00422) (0.00420) (0.00495) (0.00778) (0.00762) (0.00571) (0.00349) (0.00533) (0.0116)
Sorting Effect 0.00711∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗ 0.0241∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗ 0.0185∗∗ 0.0155∗ 0.0120 0.0104
(0.00136) (0.00272) (0.00522) (0.00771) (0.00862) (0.00904) (0.00869) (0.00797) (0.00750) (0.00659)
Panel B: by treated group
Partially Treated 0.00146 0.00440 0.00643 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0180∗∗ 0.00743 0.00525 0.00907∗∗ -0.00715 -0.00950
(0.00241) (0.00422) (0.00420) (0.00495) (0.00778) (0.00762) (0.00571) (0.00349) (0.00533) (0.0116)
Fully Treated 0.00857∗∗∗ 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0377∗∗∗ 0.0421∗∗∗ 0.0296∗∗ 0.0238∗ 0.0246∗∗ 0.00481 0.000884
(0.00253) (0.00437) (0.00541) (0.0103) (0.0134) (0.0136) (0.0126) (0.00989) (0.00853) (0.0124)
Observations 727 700 673 646 619 592 565 538 511 484
State, cohort fixed effect, and linear and quadratic state-specific time trend are controlled
Standard errors in parentheses, cluster by state, weighted by state population
States with missing year obs are dropped
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 13: Hazard Risks of Divorce: Linear and Quadratic State-Specific Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Divorce at 2nd yr 3rd yr 4th yr 5th yr 6th yr 7th yr 8th yr 9th yr 10th yr 11th yr
Panel A: by types of effects
Divorce Effect 0.00118 0.00157 0.00121 0.00171 0.000213 -0.000819 -0.000568 0.00175∗ -0.00203 -0.000930
(0.00195) (0.00216) (0.00152) (0.00218) (0.00206) (0.00123) (0.00131) (0.000927) (0.00124) (0.00123)
Sorting Effect 0.00387∗∗∗ 0.00422∗ 0.00359 0.00455∗ 0.00298 0.00196 -0.000686 -0.00118 0.000327 -0.000135
(0.00116) (0.00216) (0.00306) (0.00228) (0.00182) (0.00159) (0.00184) (0.00107) (0.00142) (0.00120)
Panel B: by treated group
Partially Treated 0.00118 0.00157 0.00121 0.00171 0.000213 -0.000819 -0.000568 0.00175∗ -0.00203 -0.000930
(0.00195) (0.00216) (0.00152) (0.00218) (0.00206) (0.00123) (0.00131) (0.000927) (0.00124) (0.00123)
Fully Treated 0.00505∗∗∗ 0.00578∗∗∗ 0.00481 0.00626∗∗ 0.00319 0.00114 -0.00125 0.000570 -0.00171 -0.00106
(0.00156) (0.00177) (0.00330) (0.00280) (0.00241) (0.00211) (0.00271) (0.00157) (0.00166) (0.00169)
Observations 727 700 673 646 619 592 565 538 511 484
State, cohort fixed effect, and linear and quadratic state-specific time trend are controlled
Standard errors in parentheses, cluster by state, weighted by state population
States with missing year obs are dropped
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 14: Cumulative Risks of Divorce: Cohort 1968-1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Divorce within 2yrs 3yrs 4yrs 5yrs 6yrs 7yrs 8yrs 9yrs 10yrs 11yrs
Panel A: by types of effects
Divorce Effect 0.00132 0.00245 0.00460 0.0132∗ 0.0126 0.0139 0.00818 0.00931∗∗ -0.000188 -0.00208
(0.00348) (0.00520) (0.00607) (0.00659) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.00542) (0.00407) (0.00502) (0.00563)
Sorting Effect 0.00844∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0227∗∗∗ 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0189∗∗ 0.0188∗∗
(0.00178) (0.00295) (0.00431) (0.00503) (0.00525) (0.00557) (0.00615) (0.00631) (0.00684) (0.00709)
Panel B: by treated group
Partially Treated 0.00132 0.00245 0.00460 0.0132∗ 0.0126 0.0139 0.00818 0.00931∗∗ -0.000188 -0.00208
(0.00348) (0.00520) (0.00607) (0.00659) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.00542) (0.00407) (0.00502) (0.00563)
Fully Treated 0.00976∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0344∗∗∗ 0.0353∗∗∗ 0.0369∗∗∗ 0.0294∗∗∗ 0.0287∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗ 0.0168∗∗
(0.00383) (0.00570) (0.00614) (0.00801) (0.0121) (0.0129) (0.00790) (0.00667) (0.00632) (0.00728)
Observations 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484
State, cohort fixed effect, and state-specific time trend are controlled
Standard errors in parentheses, cluster by state, weighted by state population
States with missing year obs are dropped
Sample is restricted to 1968-1985
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 15: Hazard Risks of Divorce: Cohort 1968-1985
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Divorce at 2nd yr 3rd yr 4th yr 5th yr 6th yr 7th yr 8th yr 9th yr 10th yr 11th yr
Panel A: by types of effects
Divorce Effect 0.00131 0.00140 0.00194 0.00312 0.00123 0.00220 0.00203 0.00288∗∗∗ 0.00129 0.00122∗
(0.00268) (0.00300) (0.00195) (0.00307) (0.00390) (0.00245) (0.00205) (0.000824) (0.000832) (0.000698)
Sorting Effect 0.00477∗∗∗ 0.00560∗∗ 0.00518∗∗ 0.00477∗∗ 0.00291∗ 0.00196 0.000330 -0.000805 0.000834 0.000953
(0.00143) (0.00241) (0.00250) (0.00215) (0.00168) (0.00169) (0.00186) (0.00141) (0.00148) (0.00105)
Panel B: by treated group
Partially Treated 0.00131 0.00140 0.00194 0.00312 0.00123 0.00220 0.00203 0.00288∗∗∗ 0.00129 0.00122∗
(0.00268) (0.00300) (0.00195) (0.00307) (0.00390) (0.00245) (0.00205) (0.000824) (0.000832) (0.000698)
Fully Treated 0.00609∗∗ 0.00701∗∗ 0.00712∗∗∗ 0.00788∗∗ 0.00415 0.00415 0.00236 0.00207 0.00212 0.00217∗∗
(0.00221) (0.00259) (0.00167) (0.00347) (0.00436) (0.00336) (0.00324) (0.00186) (0.00171) (0.000868)
Observations 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484
State, cohort fixed effect, and state-specific time trend are controlled
Standard errors in parentheses, cluster by state, weighted by state population
States with missing year obs are dropped
Sample is restricted to 1968-1985
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 16: Cumulative Risks of Divorce: Non-Weighted by State Population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Divorce within 2yrs 3yrs 4yrs 5yrs 6yrs 7yrs 8yrs 9yrs 10yrs 11yrs
Panel A: by types of effects
Divorce Effect 0.000484 0.00217 0.00195 0.00511 0.00332 0.00623 0.00771 0.0115∗ 0.00517∗∗ 0.00603
(0.00252) (0.00310) (0.00327) (0.00424) (0.00597) (0.00796) (0.00734) (0.00586) (0.00248) (0.0111)
Sorting Effect 0.00420∗∗ 0.00697∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0165∗∗∗ 0.0169∗∗∗ 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0214∗∗∗
(0.00195) (0.00265) (0.00356) (0.00433) (0.00504) (0.00551) (0.00566) (0.00560) (0.00584) (0.00624)
Panel B: by treated group
Partially Treated 0.000484 0.00217 0.00195 0.00511 0.00332 0.00623 0.00771 0.0115∗ 0.00517∗∗ 0.00603
(0.00252) (0.00310) (0.00327) (0.00424) (0.00597) (0.00796) (0.00734) (0.00586) (0.00248) (0.0111)
Fully Treated 0.00469 0.00914∗ 0.0120∗∗ 0.0178∗∗ 0.0174∗ 0.0227∗ 0.0246∗∗ 0.0289∗∗∗ 0.0254∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗
(0.00308) (0.00459) (0.00552) (0.00705) (0.00950) (0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0102) (0.00649) (0.0119)
Observations 729 702 675 648 621 594 567 540 513 486
State, cohort fixed effect, and state-specific time trend are controlled
Standard errors in parentheses, cluster by state
States with missing year obs are dropped
Non-weighted by state population
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 17: Hazard Risks of Divorce: Non-Weighted by State Population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Divorce at 2nd yr 3rd yr 4th yr 5th yr 6th yr 7th yr 8th yr 9th yr 10th yr 11th yr
Panel A: by types of effects
Divorce Effect 0.000871 0.00176 0.00147 0.00221 0.000285 0.00286 0.00245 0.00293∗ 0.000463 0.00148∗∗∗
(0.00178) (0.00155) (0.00132) (0.00166) (0.00225) (0.00223) (0.00343) (0.00152) (0.000825) (0.000408)
Sorting Effect 0.00238 0.00284∗ 0.00277∗ 0.00240 0.00138 0.00244∗∗ 0.000794 0.000162 0.00191 0.00249∗∗
(0.00148) (0.00161) (0.00146) (0.00162) (0.00148) (0.00117) (0.00150) (0.00113) (0.00135) (0.000951)
Panel B: by treated group
Partially Treated 0.000871 0.00176 0.00147 0.00221 0.000285 0.00286 0.00245 0.00293∗ 0.000463 0.00148∗∗∗
(0.00178) (0.00155) (0.00132) (0.00166) (0.00225) (0.00223) (0.00343) (0.00152) (0.000825) (0.000408)
Fully Treated 0.00325 0.00460∗∗ 0.00424∗∗ 0.00461∗∗ 0.00167 0.00530∗ 0.00325 0.00310 0.00237 0.00397∗∗∗
(0.00193) (0.00219) (0.00154) (0.00215) (0.00342) (0.00292) (0.00355) (0.00200) (0.00166) (0.000983)
Observations 729 702 675 648 621 594 567 540 513 486
State, cohort fixed effect, and state-specific time trend are controlled
Standard errors in parentheses, cluster by state
States with missing year obs are dropped
Non-weighted by state population
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 18: Partially Affected Cohorts with Different Exposure Times under UDL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Divorce within 2yrs 3yrs 4yrs 5yrs 6yrs 7yrs 8yrs 9yrs 10yrs 11yrs
Panel A: Cumulative Risks of Divorce
Divoce Effect -0.00291 -0.000204 -0.00176 0.00368 0.00218 -0.00228 -0.000969 0.00323 -0.00609 -0.00737
(0.00268) (0.00223) (0.00307) (0.00418) (0.00533) (0.00533) (0.00428) (0.00312) (0.00590) (0.00844)
Sorting Effect 0.00458∗∗ 0.00417 0.00737 0.0100 0.0165∗∗ 0.0254∗∗∗ 0.0306∗∗∗ 0.0307∗∗ 0.0442∗∗∗ 0.0542∗∗∗
(0.00183) (0.00361) (0.00507) (0.00675) (0.00770) (0.00864) (0.00990) (0.0119) (0.0148) (0.0193)
Partially × Exposure Time -0.00299 0.000302 -0.0000951 0.00173 0.00303∗∗ 0.00322∗∗ 0.00258 0.00366∗ 0.00422∗
(0.00330) (0.00240) (0.00194) (0.00153) (0.00136) (0.00142) (0.00157) (0.00182) (0.00215)
Panel B: Hazard Risks of Divorce
Divorce Effect -0.00136 0.000724 -0.000319 -0.00000381 0.000920 0.00109 0.000771 0.00360∗∗∗ 0.000623 0.00126
(0.00193) (0.00165) (0.00159) (0.00174) (0.00168) (0.00116) (0.00156) (0.000754) (0.000904) (0.000868)
Sorting Effect 0.00239∗ 0.00134 0.00273 0.00417 0.00169 0.00312 0.000599 -0.000255 0.000880 0.000691
(0.00134) (0.00199) (0.00255) (0.00291) (0.00230) (0.00201) (0.00214) (0.00201) (0.00269) (0.00246)
Partially × Exposure Time -0.00125 0.00102 0.000714 0.000177 0.000465 0.000136 0.00000168 -0.000000592 -0.0000313
(0.00132) (0.000684) (0.000769) (0.000499) (0.000375) (0.000358) (0.000163) (0.000292) (0.000259)
Observations 727 700 673 646 619 592 565 538 511 484
State, cohort fixed effect, and state-specific time trend are controlled
Standard errors in parentheses, cluster by state, weighted by state population
States with missing year obs are dropped
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes : Exposure Time is measured as years of marriage being affected by unilateral divorce laws. Partially affected cohorts that married in different year, with
the same length of marriage, are exposed to unilateral divorce laws with different lengths. The interaction term in Panel A and Panel B captures how unilateral
divorce laws affect partially affected cohorts with longer exposure time differently from those with shorter.
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A.3 Pre-trend Tests by Marriage Duration
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